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Tree cropsTree crops have changed land tenure in Africa. Farmers have acquired permanent, alienable rights, but have also
faced disputes with competing claimants and the state. Para rubber had many similar effects in the Benin region
of colonial Nigeria. Farmers initially obtained land by traditional methods. Mature farms could be sold, let out,
and used to raise credit. Disputes over rubber involved smallholders, communities of rival users, and migrants.
The impact of tree crop commercialization in Benin differed from other cases due to local context, including
pre-colonial institutions, the late spread of rubber, and the relative unimportance of migrant planters.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Property rights over land shape investment (Goldstein and Udry,
2008), labor supply (Field, 2007), long term policy outcomes (Banerjee
and Iyer, 2005), the environment (Libecap, 2007), and violence (André
and Platteau, 1998). Within Africa, land tenure is gaining importance as
population growth makes land more scarce, as farming systems evolve,
and as markets in land have become increasingly widespread (Holden
et al., 2009). It is important, then, to know how land tenure responds to
new technologies.
In this paper, I explain how the introduction of Brazilian Para rubber
transformed land rights and land disputes in the Benin region of Nigeria
during the colonial period from 1897 to 1960. The spread of rubber in-
creased farm sizes and encouraged both sale and rental markets. The
commercialization of land was gradual and not universally accepted.
Rubber led to conﬂicts within communities and between members of
local communities and outsiders, including migrants and commercial
planters. These disputes were embeddedwithin local politics and social
relations.dwaj, William Clarence-Smith,
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l rights reserved.Rubber shaped land tenure through two channels. First, it is a cash
crop that, ifmarketable, raises the value of land relative to labor. Second,
as a tree crop, the returns to investment in rubber are deferred and the
lifespan of the farm may exceed thirty years, making it unavailable for
other uses. Together, these create pressure for division and increase
the value of successfully contesting rights. The changes that occur and
the disputes that arise, however, depend on local context. Individualiza-
tion of land is only one possible response. Communities may tighten ac-
cess to the commons, let it become open access, or divide it in one of
several ways (Platteau, 2000). The outcome will depend on whether
the costs of division are high, social capital is weak, adaptability is lim-
ited, the beneﬁts are distributed unequally, or the state intervenes to
aid certain interests. Rental transactions generate intra-family tensions,
but their meaning is generally agreed upon (Colin and Woodhouse,
2010). The meanings of sale transactions are more contested. Kin and
heirs will dispute sales if they are not consulted, and sales are later
re-interpreted by the parties involved. Landmarkets, as a result, remain
“embedded” in politics and society.
I contrast Benin with other studies of tree crops in Africa. As in
these cases, rubber in colonial Benin encouraged sale and especially
rental transactions, as well as sharecropping arrangements between
peasant farmers and migrant rubber tappers. Sale in particular was
not universally accepted, and these transactions created tensions
within communities. Both types of dispute were embedded in other
relationships. There are, however, several differences. Notably, since
the bulk of migrants in the rubber industry was itinerant tappers,
rather than settler farmers, the extent of conﬂict with Nigerians
from outside Benin was limited. Pre-colonial institutions gave peas-
ants greater freedom to appropriate land and chiefs less power to ex-
tract revenues from planters than in other cases, notably that of
southern Ghana.
227J. Fenske / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 226–238I rely on oral, archival, and printed colonial sources. While my
focus is on the former Benin Kingdom, I draw on the experiences of
other rubber-producing areas of the former Bendel State, especially
Ishan (Esan) and Warri. My archival sources are taken from the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Nigeria, and consist mostly of government reports,
correspondence, and court transcripts of land disputes.1 I am able to
rely on a handful of printed reports and other secondary sources for
information and context.2 Finally, I also use 57 interviews with for-
mer farmers, rubber tappers, traders, and laborers who were active
in the rubber industry during the late colonial period as sources.3
In Section 2, I describe the “baseline” land tenure system of Benin.
In Section 3, I outline the “treatment,” giving an overview of the intro-
duction of rubber in colonial Benin. I describe my data and the “con-
trol groups” that I use to identify the impact of rubber. In Section 4, I
outline how farmers acquired land for planting rubber, and how this
changed over time. In Section 5, I show how rubber altered land
rights, transactions, and disputes, and discuss the roles played by
chiefs and migrants. In Section 6, I conclude.
2. Rural land tenure in pre-colonial Benin
In the Benin Kingdom, then, where land is plentiful, the land tenure
system is very simple and such control as is exercised over the land
is designed to add to the numbers of the village community rather
than to secure exclusive rights over its resources (Bradbury, 1973,
p. 182).
Edo-speaking Benin was conquered by Britain in 1897. It became
part of the Central Province of Southern Nigeria to 1914, when the po-
sition of Oba (king) was restored and the Benin Province became part
of a uniﬁed Nigeria (see Fig. 1). In this section, I outline pre-colonial
land tenure in Benin. Edo land tenure reﬂected the abundance of
land in the region (Usuanlele, 1988).
2.1. The state
In pre-colonial Benin, all land was said to be “owned” by the Oba. In
reality he had few powers over land outside Benin City. Ward-Price
(1939, p. 113) commented that the “Oba of Benin is the ‘owner’ of all
the land in his district, though his powers over the plots allotted to his
subjects are restricted by the principles of justice and reasonableness.”
Egharevba (1949, p. 77), similarly, suggested that the king was a trustee,
who could make grants on behalf of these people. At the West African
Lands Committee in 1912, the chiefswho testiﬁed agreed that theOba ad-
ministered land through chiefs or community heads (Rowling, 1948, p. 3).
Higher chiefs received tribute and were to be informed of the settle-
ment of new persons. Real ownership was at the village level, with the
odionwere (senior elder) and edion (elders) exercising power over land
use and allocation (Bradbury, 1973, p. 181). Blanckenburg (1963, p. 13)
wrote that land “has long been controlled by the village head and the el-
ders' council.” The odionwere was responsible for handling “petty or1 Speciﬁcally, I rely on records taken from the National Archives of the United King-
dom (NAUK) in Kew, the National Archives of Nigeria in Ibadan (NAI), and from the ar-
chives of the Oba's Palace in Benin City (OPA).
2 Particularly valuable are: Anschel (1965), an agricultural economics dissertation
on the industry as it was in the early 1960s; Blanckenburg (1963), a report for the gov-
ernment on rubber farmers in three villages in 1963; Bradbury (1957) and Bradbury
(1973), anthropological accounts of Benin based on ﬁeldwork conducted in 1956;
Egharevba (1949), a nationalist statement on “customary” law; Rowling (1948), a gov-
ernment report on land tenure in the Benin Province; Upton (1967), who surveyed
eleven farmers in each of three villages in Asaba; Usuanlele (1988, 2003), dissertations
on deforestation and class formation in colonial Benin, and; Ward-Price (1939), a re-
port on Yoruba land tenure that contains a short section on Benin.
3 These interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2009 by myself, Joseph
Ayodokun, Monday Egharevba and Amen Uyigue. These were conducted in Edo, En-
glish, Ibo, Kwale, Pidgin, and Urhobo, with the help of interpreters. English transcripts
of these are available on request.routine” land questions (Ward-Price, 1939, p. 114). Each year, those
holding land gave a present, generally produce, to the chief.2.2. Rights of community members
Any member of the community could farm new land without per-
mission, so long as no one else was farming towards the same spot
and it had not been farmed in roughly the past eight years
(Rowling, 1948, p. 4). Plots were used in the ﬁrst year for yams and
maize inter-planted in rows, and women planted other vegetables
around the stumps. In the following year, land was planted with
maize and cassava before it was left to fallow (Bradbury, 1973, p.
154). So long as only food crops were grown, Blanckenburg (1963,
p. 15) guessed that individual families farmed between three and
seven acres of land annually. This system worked because land was
abundant. Plots were used for only two years, then left to fallow for
ﬁfteen or twenty. Even as late as the 1950s, some “virgin” forest
remained around two of his study villages.
The rights gained by clearing and farming were temporary.
Ward-Price (1939, p. 115) wrote that most farmers cultivated for one
season only and then moved to a new site. When the cultivator
expressed no intention to return, this extinguished any claim. He
noted that families did not retain areas permanently; land for food
crops was held communally, “as if the whole of the people were one
large family.” Fallow land reverted to control of the community, and
was not likely to be re-cleared for some years (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45).
This does not imply that farming was communal. This did not reﬂect a
pre-modern communal ethic, but rather the abundance of land. In
1911, population density was estimated at only 21 per square mile.42.3. Land markets
With no permanent individual interests in land, sale markets were
absent and temporary transfers such as pledging or rental were rare.
Lugard (1914, p. 51) noted that “no individual rights exist or can exist
for consideration, except such rights as may exist from clearing or
cultivating the soil.” Ward-Price (1939, p. 115) suggested that crops
could be sold in the ground, “but there is no idea of a ‘sale’ as regards
the land.” In his study villages, Blanckenburg (1963, p. 15) was told
that pledging and mortgaging of farms did happen before introduc-
tion of rubber in his villages, but that sale was not allowed.2.4. Outsiders
Edo from outside the community required permission of the Enogie
(the centrally-appointed head chief, if one existed) or odionwere to set-
tle. Gifts given to these chiefs recognized their political supremacy.
Ward-Price (1939, p. 115) suggested that the Enogie could deny a
non-Edopermission to farmwithout cause. For an Edo stranger, permis-
sion of the Enogie was needed, but would not be denied. Bradbury
(1973, p. 181–182) found in 1956 that strangers who cultivated palms
temporarily, settled in the villages or in neighboring “camps,” or who
wished to use land without settling were required to obtain permission
from the odionwere. They presented him with palm wine and, in 1956,
small sums of money, which he should share with the other edion.
These gifts were only a few shillings normally, “for land [was] not a
scarce commodity.” Ward-Price (1939, p. 115) wrote that, once food
crops were planted by a native or stranger, the planter was secure. He
could sub-let his farm, but was not permitted to sell the land if he left
the community. Such land would revert to communal ownership.4 NAUK, CO 879/117/9–10: West African Lands Committee, Minutes of Evidence, p.
164.
Benin
Afenmai
Urhobo
Aboh
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Asaba
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Fig. 1. Divisions of the Benin and Warri provinces.
Source: Division boundaries are from the Willink Minorities Commission. Nigerian boundaries are from www.diva-gis.org.
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Tree crops were a minor feature of pre-colonial tenure. Excepting a
few planted kola and deliberately scattered palms, tree crops were a co-
lonial introduction (Ward-Price, 1939, p. 116). Those that grew wild
were communal. According to Rowling (1948, p. 9), no exclusive rights
existed at all overwild produce, even on land under cultivation. Any vil-
lagemember could reap them. Hewas also allowed to plant treeswher-
ever he could “ﬁnd a suitable unoccupied spot on the land belonging to
his own village area,” without permission. A non-villager Edo would
need permission of the Enogie, who could refuse, though refusalwasun-
likely (Ward-Price, 1939, p. 116). Planted trees were individually and
securely owned (Bradbury, 1957, p. 24), and the trees could be sold,
though in theory the land was not sold with them. Ward-Price (1939,
p. 116) suggested that permission of the Enogie was needed, but he
would not refuse “as chiefs are always anxious to increase the number
of people on their land.” Even if trees were planted illegally, it was con-
sidered wrong to destroy crops in the ground. In a 1940 suit, for exam-
ple, the defendant was found to be owner of the land on which he had
planted his rubber, but was ordered to pay £40 and costs to the plaintiff
for cutting down the latter's trees, “because it is against customary rule
to destroy growing plants.”5
2.6. Disputes
With abundant land, disputes were uncommon. These focused on
the political power that came with controlling settlement. In 1918,
the Resident wrote that, “this Province had always been singularly
free from Land Disputes. This is probably due to the fact that the pop-
ulation is less dense than in other Provinces.” In cases where he had
seen disputes arise, he reported that “there has been little difﬁculty
in effecting a settlement.”6 Bradbury (1957, p. 45), even later in the5 NAI, Ben Prof 8/1/5 Civil Record Book 1934–1935: EHK Obosi of Illah v. Ageture of
Illah (1940) 69/40.
6 NAI, Ben Dist 2/3 BP 446/1916 Land Disputes, Procedure in dealing with: 4 Feb,
1918: Resident Benin to Secretary, Southern Provinces.colonial period, argued that “litigation over the ownership of land as
such is non-existent outside Benin City except in a political context
where, for example, two enigie dispute their common boundaries.”
The other exception he identiﬁed was disputes over permanent crops.
3. The spread of rubber in Benin
In this section, I outline the spread of rubber in colonial Benin. I
describe how I use a sample of 83 disputes over rubber as a source
of quantitative data. I also describe comparisons I make between
Benin before and after the introduction of rubber, between rubber
farms and other plots, and between late colonial Benin and adjacent
regions that did not adopt tree crops as widely.
3.1. Origin and spread
Para rubber was introduced to Nigeria in 1895 (Anschel, 1965).
Though colonial efforts to promote rubber were abandoned in 1921,
Nigerians continued to plant it. From 1934, an international quota
scheme kept world rubber prices high. The loss of Malaya to Japan
in 1942 pushed British authorities to encourage rubber production.
Price controls, compulsion and propaganda were used to encourage
tapping and collection, and this spurred planting. By 1948, it was
guessed that 25% of Benin Division was planted to rubber
(Usuanlele, 2003, p. 161).
Despite negative propaganda and active restrictions, Benin farmers
continued to plant rubber after thewar. Bradbury (1957, p. 24) reported
that rubber and cocoawere themain sources ofmonetary income in the
region. Anschel (1965, p. 87) extrapolated fromhis own small survey, in
which 72.4% of farmers owned rubber, to estimate that in the early
1960s 113,500 farmers owned slightly more than 1.2 million acres of
rubber. Exports peaked during the ﬁrst half of the 1970s, and the indus-
try has since declined.
Rubber was overwhelmingly a smallholder crop. During the
mid-1960s, farmers coagulated the rubber they collected mostly
into lumps, while some dried them into sheets in the sun or over
Table 1
Summary statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean S.d. Min Max N
229J. Fenske / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 226–238the hearth (Anschel, 1965, p. 60). Lumps and sheets were sold mostly
to middlemen who sold the rubber on to dealers in the larger towns
or at collecting points. These dealers brought the assembled product
to a small number of exporter–processors who milled the lump into
low-quality crepe (Anschel, 1965, p. 61–64).Embedded 0.12 0.33 0 1 83
Sale 0.30 0.46 0 1 83
Rental 0.17 0.38 0 1 83
Pledge 0.060 0.24 0 1 83
Destruction 0.29 0.46 0 1 83
Chief 0.16 0.37 0 1 83
Oba 0.012 0.11 0 1 83
Boundaries 0.14 0.35 0 1 83
Non-payment 0.072 0.26 0 1 83
Inheritance 0.060 0.24 0 1 83
Strangers 0.096 0.30 0 1 83
Source: See Appendix B.3.2. Data
One of my sources of descriptive evidence is a set of 83 records of
disputes over rubber. I also use these quantitatively, in order to better
describe the types of conﬂict that entered colonial courts. I summa-
rize these disputes in Appendix B. For each record, I code dummy var-
iables that capture their characteristics. These are:
• Embedded: Whether one of the participants connects the case to an-
other dispute, such as a divorce.
• Sale: Whether the farm was ever sold.
• Rental: Whether the farm was ever rented out.
• Pledge: Whether the farm was ever pledged for debt.
• Destruction: Whether trees were destroyed or damaged.
• Chief: Whether a chief is a participant in the dispute (rather than
simply an arbitrator or court member).
• Oba: Whether the Oba has interfered directly.
• Boundaries: Whether the dispute includes a disagreement over
boundaries.
• Non-payment: Whether non-payment of a debt, sale, or rental fee is
mentioned.
• Inheritance: Whether the right to inherit the farm is disputed or
malfeasance by the executor of an estate is claimed.
• Right to sell:Whether the right of an individual to sell land is disputed.
• Strangers: Whether the case involves individuals from outside the
community.
I present summary statistics on these cases in Table 1, and I report
the correlations between these characteristics in Table 2.3.3. Identiﬁcation
There are four confounding treatments that hit Benin during the co-
lonial period, whose effects may be mis-attributed to rubber: popula-
tion growth, forest reservation, commercialization of palm produce,
and colonial rule. While it is not possible to “control” for these, since
my sources are qualitative, I restrict my focus wherever possible to
changes that were directly attributed by observers to rubber, or to dis-
putes concerning Para farms. For Blanckenburg (1963, p. 14), the
cause of individualization, commercialization, and the increase in acre-
ages was clear:
As the system changed, population density played the minor role
although today many more people live in the villages than forty
years ago. The main factor leading to a real revolution in the land
tenure system was the introduction of permanent crops like rub-
ber and cocoa into farming.
For identiﬁcation, I contrast rubber farms with those planted to
food crops, and I note where observers made the same comparison.
I also measure Benin against adjacent Afenmai Division and Ondo
Province, which were relatively untouched by tree crops. Rowling
(1948, p. 12) estimated in 1948 that Afenmai (then “Kukuruku”)
had a population density of 74 persons per square mile, or 76 persons
if forest reserves were removed, while in Benin District these ﬁgures
were 63 and 103 persons per square mile. In Afenmai, then, densities
were similar but the spread of tree crops was limited. I do not argue
that rubber had any characteristics that made its effects distinct
from those of other planted tree crops, such as cocoa.4. How land was acquired for rubber farms
In this section, I describe how planters in Benin acquired land for
rubber, and how this changed over time. I contrast Benin with other
cases of tree crops in West Africa.
4.1. Agricultural commercialization in comparative perspective
Land for tree crops in West Africa has often been obtained initially
under “customary” relationships, with few cash transfers. Where land
was sold early on, buyers' rights were less restricted than in later pe-
riods. Berry (1975) found that cocoa farmers in 1930s Ife obtained
land for small presents and a promise to pay symbolic tribute annually.
When forest land seemed inexhaustible, chiefs in Akim, Akwapim and
Ashanti alienated land to stranger farmers for a lump sum or a propor-
tion of the developed land (Robertson, 1982). As the value of tree crop
farms rose, these terms were changed; later planters paid more for
land in cash and social obligations and received more restricted rights.
Those who granted land to early farmers sought to change the terms
of these arrangements in their favor. In Ife, when cocoa began to bear,
tribute rose (Berry, 1975). As its monetary value rose, non-cash obliga-
tions fell. When forest became scarce in southern Ghana around 1950,
authorities demanded regular tribute or rent rather than permitting
outright sales. Over time, sharecropping contracts gave fewer proprie-
tary interests to tenants (Robertson, 1982).
Changes over time responded to the interwar depression, the Second
World War, and the postwar boom. During the 1930s, producer prices
were depressed. During the war, high import prices and government
controls reduced real incomes (Martin, 1989). Forced labor recruitment
intensiﬁed (Crowder, 1985). Commodity producers, ironically, expand-
ed the acreage planted to tree crops. Cash incomes were still needed to
meet colonial tax demands, and the returns to other activities fell. In Ni-
geria, individuals abandoned diminishing urban trade and business op-
portunities and turned to farming. Similarly, rural traders and artisans
devoted more time to farming (Berry, 1975). In Ashanti, cocoa planting
continued during the 1940s despite prices that were lower than they
had ever been Austin (2005, p. 330). The postwar period, by contrast,
was one of boom for many producers, and the rapid expansion of tree
crop cultivation drove further changes in land tenure. In cases such as
the Divo region of Côte d'Ivoire, the break with the pre-1945 period
was dramatic (Hecht, 1985).
Like early planters elsewhere, smallholders in Benin obtained land
by clearing forest. This was gained freely or for token payments,
though permission of local chiefs was often needed. Edo farmers ex-
panded their holdings over time to make use of fallow land and to
lay claim to land that might otherwise be appropriated. Compared
with other examples, attempts to extract payments from the owners
Table 2
Correlation coefﬁcients of case characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Embedded Sale Rental Pledge Destruction Chief Oba Boundaries Non-payment Inheritance
Sale −0.1623
Rental 0.1298 −0.0853
Pledge −0.0937 −0.1662 −0.114
Destruction −0.1544 −0.187 −0.1454 0.0619
Chief 0.0442 0.0061 −0.1056 −0.1091 0.0907
Oba −0.0409 −0.0725 −0.0497 −0.028 −0.0704 −0.0476
Boundaries 0.0583 0.0288 −0.0937 0.0399 0.1156 0.0114 −0.0454
Non-payment 0.1825 0.0195 0.1227 0.3204a −0.178 0.0077 −0.0308 −0.1148
Inheritance 0.5285a −0.0559 0.1564 −0.0641 −0.1615 −0.1091 −0.028 0.0399 0.1249
Strangers −0.1209 −0.1254 −0.1471 −0.0827 −0.1183 0.0839 0.3381a −0.1343 0.0665 −0.0827
Source: See Appendix B.
a Signiﬁcant at 5%.
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planters and customary right of Edo to claim land anywhere within
Benin. As in Ghana, efforts to restrict planting were easily evaded, es-
pecially during the war. Post-war growth was a less dramatic break
with the past than the wartime planting boom (Fenske, 2012).4.2. How planters acquired land
In Benin, smallholders generally acquired land for rubber freely,
by planting trees on their farms after they were done cultivating
food crops, instead of leaving them to fallow. Rowling (1948, p. 5)
stated that a Bini was “free to plant as he will.” In Esan, Rowling
(1948, p. 18–19) found no limitations on permanent crops, and if a
protest was raised that farmland was getting short, no legal sanction
existed to restrict planting. In the three villages he studied,
Blanckenburg (1963, p. 14) found that rubber was planted on plots
used for food crops during the second year of use. Of the 11 farmers
Upton (1967, p. 11), surveyed in each of his three Asaba villages,
100%, 100% and 53% stated that extra land was available for tree
crops. The most commonly stated means of acquiring land for tree
crops were that it was “freely available” in the ﬁrst two, and that
one would ask the head of the family in the third.
My respondents often stated that they acquired land by clearing
forest, and that no permission was needed. For example:
My father has been here for a very long time where ever you are
able to cultivate ﬁrst when it was a virgin forest becomes yours
and my father is also a son of the soil so we are native of this vil-
lage… No they don't have any permission since you are a member
of the community, you are free to open new land and plant any
crop. You know the people are very few then but the land is very
large then.7
Others stated that the odionwere had to be informed, though not
necessarily about what was being planted,8 or that all that was need-
ed was to “buy the elders drinks so that they would pray for you.”9
Examples from court cases give evidence that payments were small,
though they do not support the view that no permission was needed.
The plaintiff in a 1942 suit testiﬁed that he bought a plot of land from
Evbuomwan and four others around 1933. Knowing that he might
plant permanent crops, he gave them 5s and some tobacco.
Evbuomwan testiﬁed that he had sold the farm with approval of the
village head.10 In a 1958 suit, the plaintiff told the court he had7 Interview #6.
8 Interview #8.
9 Interview #12.
10 OPA, Benin Civil Court 1942 No. 138, #129/42 S.A. Obaseki of Benin v. Isibor of
Benin.acquired land in 1925 at Oregbene from the elders in return for
“kola nuts and drinks,” and then planted rubber and coffee.11
During the 1920s, one colonial ofﬁcer remarked that there was not
much variation in farm size in Benin. He measured ﬁfty farms to get
an average of 1.39 acres “for a man and his wife.”12 The colonial gov-
ernment believed, wrongly, that rubber farms were similar in size.
One 1959 report suggested that rubber took up “approximately
300,000 acres mostly in units of one or two acres.”13 Before the
war, this would not have been misleading. A collection of letters
sent between 1942 and 1944 to smallholders who were not tapping
their holdings gives a sample of 369 farms that averaged 474 trees
each.14 90% of these were less than 10 years old. These plantations
were largely in Iguoriakhi (32), Okha (19), Idokpa (11), Igbekhue
(11) and Ebazogbe (10).
Blanckenburg (1963, p. 16), by contrast, measured seven rubber
farms in his study villages and found them all to be much larger. His
farmers had, on average, 13.7 acres planted to rubber and 5.5 in
food crops. He also cited an unpublished survey of 150 farms that
reported 21% were under 5 acres, 46% were between 5 and
11 acres, 25% were between 11 and 20 acres, and 8% were over
20 acres. Anschel (1967, p. 3), similarly, reported that an FAO survey
had found 19.1% of rubber holdings in 47 villages of Benin Division
were above 20 acres, 41% were greater than 10, and 71.8% were
greater than 4. In his own sample, farmers averaged 13.8 acres of rub-
ber in 4.4 plots (Anschel, 1965, p. 87). In the three Asaba villages
Upton (1967, p. 11) studied, the eleven farmers in each averaged
8.52, 18.61 and 12.78 acres of rubber.
This growth in size was facilitated by the practice of planting food
farms to rubber when they would otherwise have been left to fallow.
Several of my respondents stated that their farms were built up grad-
ually. For example:
What we did was to plant part of our farmland with rubber each
year. This piecemeal type of planting continued until we ﬁnally
felt that we had planted enough rubber.15
This suggests that rubber increased farm size for technological
reasons; in a land-abundant environment, labor limited the acreage
that could be used in any season, while depletion of soil fertility
kept food crops under cultivation for only one or two years. Rubber
could continue to bear for many years, and it was possible for small-
holders to proﬁtably tap it using either their own children or by
employing sharecroppers.11 OPA, File 35/58, J.J. Idehen v. J.E. Edokpolor.
12 NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division by Nevins, DO.
13 NAI, AR8 A1b: Annual Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(Extension Services Division); 1958–59.
14 NAI, BP 2287: Rubber Farms Taken Over by the Government.
15 Interview #23.
231J. Fenske / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 226–238Usuanlele (2003, p. 103–4) adds a political economy explanation.
As chiefs abused their positions, converting communal lands into pri-
vate holdings, peasants responded by appropriating communal land
for themselves and their children. Planting rubber was one means of
gathering as much land as possible. Though farmers' motivations can-
not be observed directly, this interpretation is consistent with the
pressure that did exist on land during the 1930s and 1940s, the secure
rights that could be established by rubber planting, and the state-
ments of Blanckenburg's (1963) respondents (p. 20) that they in-
creased the sizes of their forms in order to leave as much land as
possible for their children. Usuanlele (2003, p. 105) adds that farm
sizes increased during the depression of the 1930s, as incomes fell
but tax demands did not, inciting expanded cash crop production.
These larger farms have persisted; recent surveys have given average
rubber holdings of 5.73 acres (Agwu, 2006) and 14.01 acres (Mesike
et al., 2009).
In the 1920s, ofﬁcials reported minimal inequality, as differences
in farm sizes were offset by varying soil quality.16 Blanckenburg
(1963, p. 8) believed that, in the 1960s, change was imminent. At
the time, the only major differentiation was between farmers and
Ibo tappers. In his sample, rubber holdings ranged from 8 to
25.5 acres, dependent on how long ago it had been planted, and he
believed this would soon become a source of status (p. 16). The ex-
tent of land taken was limited by the ability to recruit labor with
which to clear it; one respondent told me that, since his friend's fa-
ther had more sons than his own father, his friend's father's farm
was larger.17 Rubber, then, intensiﬁed existing inequality.
Respondents frequently stated that they had not had disputes over
their rubber farms, because they were careful to use ﬁre-resistant
trees to demarcate their boundaries.18 According to one interviewee:
According to the tradition of the land in this Imasabor village no-
body has boundary dispute because our fathers used life trees to
mark their boundaries except now that greed is setting into peo-
ple in other community because they have people in power would
try to shift the boundary we share with them but within our com-
munity it can't happen.19
Despite these precautions, conﬂicts did occur. Roughly 15% of the
disputes in my sample involve disputes over boundaries (Table 1).
In a 1936 case, the plaintiff claimed that he had been driven out by
the defendant eight years before. On ﬁnding the bush cleared in
1935, he had left a juju (magical object) in the farm until the
defendant's father begged him to remove it. The plaintiff then planted
rubber in the plot, while the defendant planted yams. The year of the
suit, the defendant cleared an adjoining portion and planted rubber,
telling the court that pineapple and kola trees marked the boundary.204.3. Changes over time
As fears arose that land was becoming scarce, and as the value of
these farms became apparent, village authorities attempted to extract
rents from new and existing planters. Dibia Afam, a farmer in the
Asaba Division, found that he had been able to acquire land freely
for planting rubber during the late 1930s and early 1940s, but once
his farms matured his relatives demanded he pay them £1 annually.21
Attempts to strategically evict stranger planters will be discussed in
Section 5.16 NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division.
17 Interview #14.
18 Interview #2.
19 Interview #14.
20 OPA, Obajere Native Court 1936 (No. 282), #204/36 Chief Iduseri of Ogheghe v.
Ebose of Ogheghe.
21 NAI, Ben Prof 1 BP 203/706, “Dibia Afam, petition from.”The Great Depression and Second World War affected the acquisi-
tion of land for rubber plantations in Benin differently than elsewhere.
Itwas during the 1930s that the expansion of rubber cultivation ﬁrst be-
came notable. As other sources of income dried up and colonial tax de-
mands remained persistent, rubber became attractive. This was similar
to other cases of tree crops inWest Africa. Particular to rubber were the
relatively high prices maintained by the International Rubber Regula-
tion Agreement. Further, as pointed out above, Edo smallholders faced
a speciﬁc pressure to use rubber farms as a method of making perma-
nent claims on communal land (Usuanlele, 1988, p. 249–254).
The growth of rubber plantations during the 1930s was restricted
by the 1937 Permanent Crops Order. This was supported by both the
Agricultural Department and by the Oba, due to fears about food se-
curity and the privatization of communal lands (Usuanlele, 1988, p.
146–147). The order required individuals to obtain the consent of
the odionwere and the Oba before planting tree crops.
These restrictions did not survive during the war. In contrast to
the producers of other export crops during the war, Nigerian rubber
farmers saw their terms of trade improve; the price paid for rubber
rose faster than import prices. Despite these gains, wage rates also in-
creased, and so farmers whose household labor was insufﬁcient left
their farms under-utilized (Fenske, 2012). The war brought a boom
in rubber planting because of greater prices and further pressures to-
wards land appropriation; by 1948, a quarter of Benin Division was
under rubber (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 161–163). The colonial state wor-
ried this expansion would leave Benin vulnerable to a postwar price
collapse and made land unavailable for food crops. The state could
not, however, convince farmers to share these worries or effectively
enforce the Permanent Crops Order. By the end of the war, it had be-
come ineffective (Fenske, 2012). Attempts to revive it failed in Benin.
Local ordinances restricting planting were passed in Warri Province,
but were successfully evaded by local planters (Fenske, 2012).
5. The impact of rubber on tenure and conﬂict
In this section, I outline the impact of the spread of rubber in Benin
on the development of land rights and land transactions, with a par-
ticular focus on sale and inheritance. I discuss the role of chiefs and
“strangers” in this process, and contrast these patterns with those ob-
served in areas that were relatively untouched by the cultivation of
tree crops. Throughout, I describe the disputes that arose from these
changes and I highlight the implications of these patterns for agricul-
tural commercialization in general.
5.1. Agricultural commercialization in comparative perspective
Besley (1995) refers to African tenure systems as “Lockean,” argu-
ing that investments such as tree crops create rights in land. Tree
crops in Africa have led to more individualized holdings during the
generation of the original planter. This has been true, for example,
in the Akan regions of Ghana (Benneh, 1970), in the Nigerian cocoa
belt (Berry, 1975), and in the coffee-growing parts of Côte d'Ivoire
(Kobben, 1963). Due to inheritance systems and labor arrangements
that give proprietary interests to multiple claimants, individualization
is often reversed over time (Berry, 1988).
Trees also spur land markets, but these remain socially embedded
and the prices paid do not fully reﬂect productive value (Colin and
Woodhouse, 2010). Land is transferred through awide range of transac-
tions, including sales, inheritance, leases, pledges, and sharecropping. In
the Oumé District of Côte d'Ivoire, for example, early transfers were
“sale in the classical sense, subject tomanifestations of respect and grat-
itude,” but today the death of a patron leads to renegotiation and de-
mands for more cash. Duties of gratitude remain important in
securing a migrant planter's legitimacy (Chauveau and Colin, 2010).
Tree crops have led to disputes. Many arise because land markets
remain “embedded”. Because several mechanisms of acquiring rights
22 NAI, Ben Prof 1 BD 65 Vol 11: Petition Benin Native Court: Osionwanwri to DO,
Benin c. 1936.
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depends on individuals' abilities to exercise claims rather than on for-
mal rules (Berry, 1988). Participants draw on social relationships, in-
cluding descent, marriage, ethnicity, and patron–client ties to defend
their rights. A Yoruba cocoa farmer's heir may have rights that conﬂict
with those of his wives, sharecroppers, or other children who worked
the farm (Berry, 1989). The right to transfer land to outsiders has
been particularly contested. In Oumé, these conﬂicts are largely be-
tween the village or district heads who were the early grantors and
the heads of smaller family groups who made later transfers
(Chauveau and Colin, 2010).
Rubber in Benin increased the permanency of land rights. Rubber
farms could be alienated temporarily, by rental, pledge, or sharecrop,
or permanently by sale or inheritance. Disputes arose especially from
the sale of rubber farms. The alienability of these farms was not imme-
diate, and farm owners' rights were contested by other community
members. In Benin, observers noted that disputes over tree crops
were a problem. These were caught up in other social conﬂicts. These
outcomes mirror other cases of tree crop production, and support the
conclusion that these West African experiences are generalizable.
The inﬂuence of chiefs has differed across cases of commercializa-
tion. In southern Ghana, chiefs proﬁted from cocoa cultivation. They
held allodial title to lands within their jurisdiction, and could demand
payments from both stranger and non-stranger planters (Benneh,
1970). Amanor and Ubink (2008) charge that Ghanaian chiefs have
frequently re-interpreted custom in their favor. These re-deﬁnitions
have excluded the poor, and have converted past sales into leases.
This has been accomplished with the help of the state; the power of
chiefs over land is written into the Ghanaian constitution (Amanor,
2008). Chiefs in southern Ghana now sell land for commercial pur-
poses without surrendering ultimate control of it (Boni, 2008). In
the Nigerian cocoa belt, by contrast, chieﬂy powers were more limit-
ed. Yoruba chiefs were consulted when transactions occurred, and
they presided over land disputes. They did not, however, own land
apart from what they acquired on their own or through their families
(Berry, 1975). Similarly, chiefs in Côte d'Ivoire were restricted by the
government's support for migrant planters (Berry, 2008).
Despite his nominal ownership of all land in Benin, the Oba was not
able to convert smallholder planters into a major source of revenue. Al-
though local chiefs collected fees from planters, these were small and
ad-hoc. Edo chiefs were, however, active as planters, as participants in
disputes, and as arbitrators. Many of their rights were entrenched
under colonial law, especially through the system of Native Courts.
Three factors help explain these differences. First, what took place
under colonial rule was shaped by what existed before it. The
pre-colonial right to take land freely throughout Benin limited the
claims that could be made against Edo planters, stranger or other-
wise. Second, the absence of a class of non-Edo planters limited ex-
traction, since itinerant tappers had more power to seek out
favorable agreements and leave if these were altered. Third, rubber
planting only expanded throughout Benin after the colonial state
had become relatively entrenched (Fenske, 2013). Chiefs' attempts
to control planting could be reviewed by colonial ofﬁcials, who
could check abuses and who attempted to regularize these powers
through legislation such as the Permanent Crops Ordinance.
Migrants in West Africa have acquired land through “economic”
relationships that also entail subordination, dependence and “pa-
tron–client” ties (Berry, 1989). Sales to these strangers have been
reinterpreted later as customary tenancies. Conﬂict emerges between
descendants of landowners and planters. Suppliers of land in Ghana-
ian abusa contracts see these as labor hire agreements, while sup-
pliers of labor view them as land leases (Robertson, 1982). Conﬂicts
within African communities have focused on grants made to out-
siders. In Oumé, urban returnees since the 1980s have pressured fam-
ily heads to recover land transferred to migrants (Chauveau and
Colin, 2010).Migrants who entered Benin throughout the colonial period were
a source of both rent and resentment, but few of these came to plant
rubber. The stranger planters that did exist had more limited rights
than locals and faced opportunistic eviction. The ethnic dimension
of these conﬂicts was muted. Most tappers were migrant Ibo, and
conﬂicts with these communities focused on political control, not
land. This contrasts with the major role of migrant planters in
Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Conﬂicts between locals and migrants
were less pronounced in Benin, because most migrants did not
make permanent claims rivaling those of potential local planters.
More mobile than planters whose capital had become ﬁxed, itinerant
tappers were less vulnerable to reinterpretation of initial agreements.
5.2. Changes in land rights
In contrast to the lack of recognition of rights over fallow land, rights
over rubber farms were more permanent. Ward-Price (1939) found no
recognized rights in fallow during the early 1930s. After the war, the
Oba told Rowling (1948, p. 4) that “whatever the position of old,
when land was plentiful and strangers few and when no one therefore
bothered over claims to fallow, the spread of permanent crops which
have enchanced [sic] the value of land as well as growing fears about
shortage, are leading to insistence upon them.” Only the rights secured
by planting tree crops appeared to have permanency (p. 6). Fallow land
no longer reverted to the community (Blanckenburg, 1963, p. 14).
Land ownership became less communal, and gave the planter or his
family more exclusive rights over the land. Ownership of land under
rubber held in practice, though not in theory, and the family became
the landholding unit (Blanckenburg, 1963, p. 14). Egharevba (1949, p.
79) highlighted the development, writing that a “change is, however,
coming over the whole system of land [t]enure. More and more, the
right of each man to ownership of his land is being recognized … and
this is largely due to the permanent crops put down.” The permanence
and exclusivity created by planting tree crops explains why rival claim-
ants to a plot of land often destroyed a planter's trees.More than a quar-
ter of the rubber disputes in my sample involved trees that had been
burnt, uprooted, or otherwise damaged (Table 1).
5.3. Changes in land transactions
5.3.1. Inheritance
Before the spread of rubber cultivation, a son would inherit only
standing crops and the right to continue in an area under cultivation
(Rowling, 1948, p. 8). Even the Oba recognized that by 1948 this had
changed. By the 1960s, rubber was among the inheritance to be divid-
ed (Blanckenburg, 1963, p. 20). One petitioner wrote to the govern-
ment during the 1930s to appeal a case in which he had sued for his
late father's cocoa trees, pear trees, thatches and rubber trees, and
had won all but the “most valuable one — the rubber trees.”22
Today, forest clearing has been replaced by acquisition through in-
heritance. This is apparent from modern surveys. Of 23 of my inter-
viewees classiﬁed as “farmers,” 10 stated that they or their parent
had cleared the land from virgin forest, 3 had obtained it freely or
from the community, 6 had inherited the land, one had acquired
land through a mixture of inheritance and clearing, and the rest either
did not know, did not answer, or listed other methods. Agwu (2006),
by contrast, in a recent survey of 50 rubber farmers, found that 76%
acquired their land through inheritance, 16% through rental, and 8%
through purchase.
Joint inheritance was less prevalent than in other parts of West Af-
rica, as Benin had a tradition of primogeniture. A man's ancestral
house was the exclusive property of his eldest son (Ogbobine, 1974,
p. 36). The eldest son also received the bulk of the deceased's
30 Udo Native Court 1922 #227: #95/22 — Enbokwohesu v. Diajbonya.
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to rubber plantations; a man who wished to divide his rubber farms
while still alive would be obligated to leave at least one for his eldest
son (Rowling, 1948, p. 8). Typically, the eldest son would inherit the
largest portion, with the rest divided among the remaining children
(Blanckenburg, 1963, p. 20).
Inheritance, then, had less power to convert holdings into family
property. According to one respondent:
[A]s long as the initial owner of the rubber was alive he claim
ownership of the rubber trees. But if such a person die and the
children have to inherit they must sub divide the plantation and
that is very common so you could have a plantation that is own
by one person but subdivided into individual children as owner.23
Several of my respondents denied that communal ownership of
rubber farms was possible, afﬁrming instead that all were owned in-
dividually.24 Another referred explicitly to the division of his father's
plantation when he inherited it.25 Indeed, one motivation for in-
creased farm sizes was the fear that inherited farms would be
fragmented into portions too small to support a man's children
(Blanckenburg, 1963, p. 20). This difference from other cases of tree
crops in West Africa demonstrates that the probability of a reversal
of individuation depends on the norms of inheritance that exist
prior to the commercialization of tree crops. Where joint inheritance
is uncommon, this reversal is less likely.
Even so, conﬂicts occurred between heirs. Roughly 7% of the cases
in my sample concern inheritance disputes. In a 1947 suit, the plain-
tiff told the court that his father had three rubber farms which, along
with a goat and £4, were given as bride price to the defendant. Since
his father's death, the defendant had been “troubling” the plaintiff
with juju, though she claimed to have planted the farms herself. The
court found for the plaintiff on the grounds that the property had
not been shared on his father's death.26
Conﬂicts over rubber were embedded in social relations. In
Table 1, a little more than a tenth of disputes over rubber in my sam-
ple were explicitly connected by participants to other ongoing con-
ﬂicts. In an otherwise unremarkable dispute from 1944, the plaintiff
believed the defendant bore malice towards her because his daughter
had married her ex-husband.27 Table 2 shows that cases involving in-
heritance were particularly intertwined with other disputes. The
plaintiff in a 1946 case told the court that, after the death of their mu-
tual father, the defendant had inherited three rubber farms. On learn-
ing that he was born to a different father, she sued to recover these.
The defendant replied that “[h]e was my father before he died,” and
claimed to have paid £4 of his adoptive father's debts, while the plain-
tiff had only paid £3. After losing the case, he petitioned the District
Ofﬁcer for a review on the grounds that his expenses in maintaining
the farms had not been considered, and that twelve years of “ﬁlial
duties” to his late adoptive father had gone uncompensated.28
The archival record is too sparse to make generalizations about the
impact of rubber on the status of women. One case heard in 1944 re-
veals some of the unique challenges they faced.29 The plaintiff sued
for a rubber farm, but the defendant claimed that it had originally
belonged to her father, who had died eleven years before. The plain-
tiff enlisted the defendant's former husband as his witness, but on
cross-examination he admitted his testimony was motivated by
their divorce. The defendant told the court that after the divorce,23 Interview #13.
24 Interviews #1, 5, 8, 9, 11, and 20.
25 Interview #15.
26 OPA, Egbede NC 1946 # 310: #10/47 Azalakian of Ebue v. Ehigiamusoe of Ebue.
27 OPA, Appeal Civil Record Book #244, Case A 223/44 Edegbe pf Benin v. Inomwan of
Benin.
28 NAI, BD 430 285: Petition re: Oba's court civil case.
29 OPA, Court Cases 1944 #90: #1127/44 — Edegbe of Benin v. Imemwan of Benin.she had gone to Lagos. She had returned to visit seven years before
the case, and found the plaintiff digging ridges for his yams. She
“told [her] people,” but her new husband would not let her return
to Benin until she had borne him a child. When she came back four
years before the case, she sued the plaintiff successfully in the ward
council. On inspection, the plaintiff's witnesses were hostile to the in-
spector, while Chief Edohen “who [was] the landlord, denied knowing
[the plaintiff] as the owner of the plantation in dispute.” The court
remarked that the plaintiff was obviously making his claim because
the eldest child of the plantation owner was a woman, dismissing
his case.5.3.2. Sale and mortgage
Once planted, permanent crops could be alienated by sale, pledge
or mortgage (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45). Rowling (1948, p. 6) reported
that an Edo was “free to do what he likes with crops of all kinds,”
and could sell, pledge or mortgage these, though there were restric-
tions on alienation to a non-Edo. The Ekiadolor Central Court in
1940 upheld that consent by Village Council or Enogiewas not needed
for sale to a “freeborn man of the village” (Rowling, 1948). Should a
stranger wish to leave the district, he was free to sell to a “native of
the soil” (Egharevba, 1949, p. 79). By contrast, I have only found
one example of a sale of land not planted to permanent crops.30
Mortgages of rubber with foreclosure dates were practiced, as were
pledges that gave the lender use rights until the principal was repaid
(Rowling, 1948, p. 6). One petitioner claimed in 1941 that he had loaned
his friend £15 to buy three farms, which was to be repaid via the sale of
rubber sheets. It was agreed that, should the friend fail to repay, the
farms were to become his. This happened, and he had successfully
sued for the farms at the Benin Native Court.31 In Agbor, by contrast,
pledging of rubber was rare (Rowling, 1948, p. 28).
Important reasons for sale were to raisemoney for payment of bride
price, building of a house, or for the education of children
(Blanckenburg, 1963, p. 15). Purchasers were mainly farmers short of
land, and farms with high yielding trees were less frequently sold
than low-yielding or young, untapped farms. The price paid depended
on supply and demand as well as on the personal relationship between
parties and characteristics of the plot (Blanckenburg, 1963, p. 15). From
primary and secondary sources, I have collected 19 examples of farms in
which I know both the price paid and (roughly) the year of the sale (see
Appendix A). While the sample size makes inference difﬁcult, I have
plotted these in Fig. 3 along with the running mean of the price per
farm. The results are consistent with the interpretation that, from the
beginning of the SecondWorldWar on, the sale prices of farmswere in-
creasing in Benin alongside the rising price of rubber. Rising consumer
prices after the late 1930s, however, may have eroded much of the
real beneﬁt to farm owners.32
Conﬂicts arose especially from sales; in Table 1, nearly a third of rub-
ber disputes in my sample involved plots that had been sold. A little
over 5% had been pledged. As in other parts of Africa, many of these in-
volved the family members of the original seller attempting to reclaim
land that had been lost. One petitioner wrote in 1941 that he had pur-
chased a farm of 412 trees in 1938 for £2/10, and had since added
more and put identifyingmarks on these. When the seller died, another
man claimed the property. The petitioner asked that he bemade to take31 NAI, Ben Dist 1 BD 28 Vol 11 Oba's Court Appeals; 22 Nov 1941: Petition by
Guobadia.
32 I am not aware of a consumer price index for Nigeria that would allow adjustment
for inﬂation. If these ﬁgures are deﬂated using the cost of living estimates from
Frankema and Waijenburg (2012), there is a positive uptick in real farm prices during
the early 1940s, though the series is truncated after the war. Deﬂating farm prices
using the nominal wages for Lagos reported by Frankema and Waijenburg (2012) or
the consumer price index for Ghana calculated by Bowden et al. (2008), the series is
ﬂat after the mid-1930s. If the export price of rubber reported in Fig. 2 is similarly de-
ﬂated, it also shows no positive trend.
Fig. 2. Nigerian rubber exports and prices over time.
Source: Anschel (1965).
Fig. 3. Farm prices over time. Notes: The solid line is the result of a locally weighted
running mean smoother with a bandwidth of 1 of the nominal sale price against the
year of sale, omitting one outlier of £70.
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that his father had bought a farm from Ije, and that he had completed
the purchase price after his father's death. “The present boom in rubber
prices,” however, had “caused the family of Ije tomake a try towrest the
rubber plantation from [him].” They sued for eviction in 1937, and the
petitioner won, but then another relative sued him to cease tapping op-
erations.34 The defendant in a 1954 suit had bought her farm land from
one Igbinovia in 1947, with another man Fakaukun present as witness.
After she deserted her husband, Fakaukun sold the farm to M.C. Ishola
Coker,who sold it to the plaintiff for £25 in 1954. The court found no ev-
idence that Fakaukun had ever owned the farm, and decided for the
defendant.35
Other disputes highlighted questions about who had the right to
sell. Trees alone did not confer sale rights. Social status also mattered,
as in Berry (1989) or Goldstein and Udry (2008), because claims had
to be pursued in social venues. One petitioner in 1942 claimed that
Chief Iyamu falsely pretended to have bought a farm from his father
for £10 and then re-sold it for £30 while their dispute was in court.
The petitioner argued that he, not his father, had planted the trees
and that he had a document showing he had even rented out the
farm before the dispute.36 In a 1944 suit, the defendant claimed to
have bought a farm the year before. The lower court, District Ofﬁcer
and Resident, however, all felt he needed the permission of the Oba
and odionwere to make the sale.37
Sale was not universally accepted, and farm owners' alienation
rights were contested by others. I classiﬁed 23 of my respondents as
“farmers,” though most had worked as children on a parent's farm
during the colonial period. When asked if they or their father could
sell land, eight avoided the question and answered that their father
would never sell land. Four more similarly responded that he had
not sold any. Two responded yes, and four more made the distinction
that trees could be sold, but not land. One told me that:
No we don't sell land in our culture, all a father will desire is to
pass his land to his children as inheritance.3833 NAI, Ben Dist 1 BD 28 Vol 11 Oba's Court Appeals: 23 Nov, 1941: Letter to District
Ofﬁcer.
34 NAI, Ben Prof 1 BD 65 Vol 13: Petitions Benin Native Court. 30 Jan, 1937: Chief
Ezoumunoglu to District Ofﬁcer.
35 OPA, Court Proceedings Record Book 1954–55 #52, #843/54 A Izenbokun of Benin
City v. Igberioghene of Benin City.
36 NAI, Ben Dist 1 BD 28 Vol 11 Oba's Court Appeals, 28 Aug, 1942: Idahosa of Benin to
DO, Benin Division.
37 OPA, Benin Divisional Court 1944 #130, A235/44 Edeoghomwan of Ogbeson v.
Awotu of Ogbeson.
38 Interview #5.29 of 78 rubber farmers in Anschel's (1965) sample said they may
not sell without seeking permission of village elders. Blanckenburg
(1963, p. 15) found it hard to ﬁnd information about sales; only two
general informants at Owe conﬁrmed their existence, none of the
nine farmers there said they knew anything about sales, and the
topic was “not discussed openly.” At Okuor, the subject was similarly
taboo. Only one young farmer declared he had bought three rubber
farms. After the ﬁrst sales at Okuor, the elders' council prescribed
that land should be sold only within the family, but this was not ob-
served. At Ova, the “best located” of his three villages, the topic was
more frankly discussed, with sales dating back to roughly 1944. In
Esan, Rowling (1948, p. 19) reported that attempted sale or mortgage
could result in eviction. None of the three villages Upton (1967, p. 15)
studied had land sales. None of the farmers he interviewed believed it
was “right” to sell land (p. 65), because it was not customary, because
it belonged to the community, because it was inherited, and because
there was not enough land.5.4. Chiefs
Chiefs were both planters and participants in disputes. In Table 1,
roughly 15% of disputes in my sample include chiefs as participants.
In a 1938 petition, the complainant claimed that he had sued Chief
Elema over a plantation and had won in court after being made to
take an oath.39 The Benin Civil Court decided in 1942 that several
chiefs at Uteh, including the Enogie, had conspired to deprive the
plaintiff of land on which the defendant had planted rubber.40 The
Enogie of Oghehghe turned to the courts to settle his dispute with a
fellow villager.41
Chieﬂy claims over land were recognized in British legislation. One
third of timber royalties, for example, went to village heads (Rowling,
1948, p. 11). Similarly, local chiefs were able to collect revenues from
the communal rubber plantations established before the end of the
First World War, and could demand rents from strangers such as
the Urhobo and Isoko who worked palm produce. The PCO, men-
tioned above, formalized the requirement that the odionwere consent
to the planting of tree crops by “strangers.” Further, chiefs attempted
to use indirect rule to formalize their authority. The Etsako council in39 NAI, Ben Dist I BD 65 Vol 20 Petition Benin Native Court, 12 Jan 1938: Obaduyi of
Benin to Reviewing Ofﬁcer.
40 OPA, Benin Civil Court 1942 #290: #1705/42 — JE Obaseki of Benin v. Erhabor of
Benin.
41 OPA, Obajere NC 1936 #282: #204/26: Chief Iduseri of Oghehghe v. Ebose of
Ogheghe.
51 OPA, Egbede NC 1940–41, #204: #315/40 Ihasuyiof Ebhor v. Akorobo.
52 OPA, Egbede, Ohuan NC Criminal record 1953–54, #117: #182/53 Parties illegible.
53 OPA, e.g. Benin NC 1939 #221: #2051/39: S.O. Bazuaye v. Argbe both of Benin, or;
Benin NC #315/1945–56: #480/46, Ojo of Benin v. Evbobome of Benin, or; Benin Civil
Court Record book 1941 #15: #727/51 (1951 case inserted between pages 94 and 95 of
1941 book).
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that land was held on behalf of the village by the council, that the
council was the proper lessor of any land, and that the leading mem-
bers of the council should sign any lease to show the council's
consent.
Chiefs presided over Native Courts. A 1941 petitioner seeking to
foreclose on three plantations offered as surety for debt complained
that the debtor was “very friendly” with one of the court members,
and had thus been able to forestall a bench warrant by appealing to
the Oba's court.42 Similarly, one Idahosa of Benin in 1942 wrote to
the District Ofﬁcer that he was involved in a dispute with Chief J.O.
Iyamu of Benin over his father's rubber plantation. While Iyamu
claimed to have bought the plantation for £10, Idahosa did not believe
that his father would have sold it for so little. He charged that Iyamu
“at one time a court clerk, knows how to make case, and knows also
now to twist matters to suit his whims and caprices.”43
Chiefs used these courts to defend their rights. In 1940, the Oba
advised the Village Council of Uhen to sue several non-natives ac-
cused of planting cocoa and farming without their consent in court,
which they did successfully.44 This was not always their ﬁrst course
of action — the elders of Eferufe had initially attempted to stop the
defendant in a 1940 suit from farming without their permission by
placing a juju in his farm. Only after he persisted did they sue.45
Courts were only one venue in which these cases were resolved.
One respondent described a dispute that involved his father:
When my father brush the forest he too also brush the forest by
my father side and they both planted rubber on their farm after
many year the man said the boundary is not where it was before,
claiming that part of my father's farm was his own … We have
odionwere in this community the matter got to the odionwere
and the community make peace between both of them.46
Individuals, then, had to navigate local politics to press their
claims. Samson Odia petitioned the District Ofﬁcer in 1937, writing
that he had sued two persons for damages to his rubber farm on
land they claimed. When his ﬁrst case was dismissed, he appealed
to the Oba, who sent inspectors he considered unsuitable. When he
asked that chiefs be sent instead, he was upbraided. He found the
two defendants discussing the inspection with Chief Oliha at his
house; though the Iyashere had awarded him £10, Chief Oliha
“being already prejudiced” upset this.47 The other parties, for their
part, claimed that they objected to the Iyashere “alone” agreeing to
award £10 to the plaintiff on his swearing an oath, against the objec-
tions of other chiefs.48
Chiefs often remained responsible for land grants and frequently
asserted the right to approve of alienation. The plaintiff in a 1940
suit told the court that he had brought 2 bottles of schnapps and 20
kola nuts with him when he received land from the elders.49 In a
1938 suit, one witness told the court that the land was “sold with con-
sent of families. I am head of family and nobody could sell land with-
out my consent.”5042 NAI, Ben Dist 1 BD 28 Vol 11 Oba's Court Appeals; 22 Nov 1941: Petition by
Guobadia.
43 NAI, Ben Dist 1 BD 28 Vol 11 Oba's Court Appeals, 28 Aug, 1942: Idahosa of Benin to
DO, Benin Division.
44 OPA, Usen NC 1939–41 No 306, #274, 275, 277 and 282 of 1940: VC Uhen v. Ehaga
and ors of Uhen.
45 OPA, Usen NC 1939–41 No 306, #201/40: BNA v. Eferufe.
46 Interview #17.
47 NAI, Ben Prof 1 BD 28 Vol 6: Oba's Court Appeals: Petition of Samson Odia, 25
March 1937.
48 NAI, Ben Prof 1 BD 28 Vol 6: Oba's Court Appeals: 25 March 1937: Igiebor and
Iyigue to DO Benin City.
49 OPA, Benin Civil Court 1940 #137: #3586/40, Okungbowa of Benin v. Umeoghisen
(?) of Benin.
50 NAI, Ben Prof 8 1 9 Civil Record Book 1936–1938: Obaze of Benin v. Osague of Be-
nin (1938) 58/38.Benin chiefs also retained a role in settling disputes outside the
courts. The plaintiff in a 1940 suit told the court that he ﬁrst went
to the elders when the defendant damaged his kola trees.51 Similarly,
the plaintiff in a 1953 suit went ﬁrst to the senior in his camp when
the defendant unlawfully tapped his rubber.52 The plaintiff in another
1942 case told the court that he had originally gone to the ward coun-
cil when the defendant tapped his rubber. The council had been un-
able to render judgment when the defendant was not satisﬁed that
the plaintiff's witness only swore one juju. They reported this to the
Oba, who advised the plaintiff to sue, which he did successfully.
Many other examples exist in which claimants went to the local
chiefs for dispute resolution, to show them their boundaries, or
lodge their complaints before coming to court.53 Elders' testimony
was also used by others to defend and uphold their claims in court.
The defendant in a 1942 suit used the fact that the elders had ap-
proved his ownership of a rubber farm to convince the court that
the plaintiff had created a false claim against him.54
In particular, the people of Benin often sought the assistance of the
Oba to defend their interests. His intervention in the cases in my sam-
ple is relatively rare (Table 1), and was particularly likely in cases in-
volving strangers (Table 2). In 1926, the people of Aduwawa
complained to him that one Obasohan, an Ehor cocoa and rubber
planter, had extended his farms and uprooted their yams.55 In 1935,
similarly, one Aghaedo wrote to the Oba and to the District Ofﬁcer
that, after his father died, a group of “troublesome people” had gath-
ered together to bar him from farming. He wrote that these men had
also bothered his father in the Native Court, until he received the as-
sistance of several chiefs, including the Oba Eweka II. This time, he
only wished to alert the Oba that “some of the villagers or Benin
may trouble me because my father died. So I draw your attention be-
fore such quarrel in case it appears in future.”56
5.5. Strangers
5.5.1. Tappers
Non-Edo migrants were typically tappers, not planters. They were
mostly Ibo, with some Urhobo. Rubber farms were often rented or
sharecropped out to these tappers, since smallholders frequently
had more acres under rubber than their family labor would allow
them to exploit. Examples from court records include a farm rented
since about 1937 on which the rent since 1943 had been £15 pounds
per year,57 a 1000 tree farm rented around 1936 for £7 per year,58 or
prices per year per tree— 2d in 1939,59 3d in 1937,60 or 2d during the
late 1940s.61 The Benin Native Authority rented out rubber. In 1929 it
reduced the rent on a farm let out to £2/10 for two years.62 The Obi ofOPA, Benin Civil Court 1942 #138, #425/42 J.C. Edebiri of Benin v. Okhasuyi of
Benin.
55 NAI, BP 111/1925 Appeal Against the Oba's Judicial Council, 8 Feb, 1929: Obasohan
to Resident and 26 March 1929: Oba to Resident.
56 NAI, Ben Prof 1 BD 65 Vol 7: Petition Benin Native Court, 17 Oct 1935: Aghaedo to
DO Benin City and 16 Oct 1935: Aghedo to Oba.
57 OPA, Benin Native Court #315, 1945–46: #252/46 Ayi Belo of Benin v. Amadasun of
Benin.
58 OPA, Benin Native Court 1938–39 #212, 178/39, Ikehen of Benin v. Ihabowa (?) of
Ologbo.
59 OPA, Benin Civil Court Record Book 1941 #15, #179/1940, Amadasun of Benin v.
A.B. Suberu of Benin.
60 OPA, Benin Native Court 1938–39 #212, 521/39: Joseph Obazie of Benin v. A
Wilkey of Benin.
61 OPA, Benin Native Court 1949 #206, 841/49, Ojo Osagie of Benin v. Avibayor
Oniawe of Benin.
62 NAI, Ben Dist 1 14 24 29 Oba's Judicial Council: Minutes of Council Meeting 10/12/
1929.
236 J. Fenske / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 226–238Agbor coordinated the lease of eighteen farms totalling 17,407 trees
to the Bata Shoe Company at 4d per tree in 1946.63 Osagie (1988, p.
55) cites one example of 172 trees let out in Esan at 6d per tree for
one year, with a promise that the rent would double if the rubber
were “roughly tapped.”
Many smallholders let out their farms on a one half share system.
Colonial ofﬁcials worried that these short-term arrangements did not
give tappers adequate incentives to maintain the health of their trees.
The Production Ofﬁcer in 1945 complained that “a lot of time [had]
been wasted training men, who leave within a few weeks generally
because of some dispute between the Tappers and the Owner regard-
ing remuneration.”64 A 1959 report by the Ministry of Agriculture
claimed that:
The main concern of these itinerant tappers is the maximum of
proﬁt in the short term for the minimum of expenditure of time
and effort. The trees have been dreadfully mutilated, maintenance
is neglected and the farms are consequently liable to have ﬁres
through them during the dry season… The majority of farms have
been almost completely ruined by bad tapping.65
Blanckenburg (1963, p. 17–18) echoed these concerns, claiming
that many Ibo only stayed for a few months and that farmers found
supervision to be useless, since a tapper who was too harshly criti-
cized would leave. Only 8 of 14 farmers he asked were satisﬁed
with their tappers' methods (p. 23). The contract cited above in
which rents would rise if the trees were harmed suggests, however,
that farmers were aware of this problem and gave tappers incentives
to behave properly. Further, former tappers told me that they would
tap for the same farmer for many years, and so this repeated interac-
tion could produce better outcomes than in a one-shot game.66 Sim-
ilarly, farmers could supervise the work of tappers by checking
whether the trees they tapped were healing correctly.67
The disputes that arose from rentals, as in other parts of Africa,
centered more on conditions and on non-payment than on their legit-
imacy. In Table 1, a little over 15% of the rubber disputes in my sample
involved land that had been rented at some point, and roughly one
tenth involve strangers. Similarly, disputes involving land that had
been pledged were particularly likely to concern non-payment of a
debt (Table 2). In a 1949 suit, for example, the plaintiff claimed the
defendant had tapped an additional 200 trees not included in their
agreement.68 These conﬂicts were bound up with other transactions
and social considerations. In one 1940 case, the defendant owed a lit-
tle over £5/3 for a 620 tree farm, but the plaintiff claimed he had only
paid £2.69 The defendant hired laborers to tap the farm. In April, the
plaintiff demanded an advance that he could use on bride-price in
taking a wife. The defendant claimed he had no money, and so the
plaintiff took away his tools. The defendant then loaned money to
the plaintiff through his eldest son. The defendant's workers, howev-
er, began to desert because of the lack of work. The court was sympa-
thetic to this, awarding the plaintiff only £1/8.
Disputes with these strangers focused less on land and more on
their failure to assimilate and their supposed evasion of taxes and
rents. Udo (1975, p. 34) claimed that Edo migration after 1960 was
“essentially internal, being concerned with the expansion of rubber63 NAI, BP 1273: Rubber Industry Benin Province: 30 Aug, 1946: DO Asaba toResident
Benin.
64 NAI, WP 149 rubber production. 23/4/1945: Production ofﬁcer to residents Warri
and Benin.
65 NAI, AR8 A1b: Annual Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(Extension Services Division). April–March 1958–59.
66 Interview #25.
67 Interview #1.
68 OPA, Benin Native Court 1949 #206, 841/49, Ojo Osagie of Benin v. Avibayor
Oniawe of Benin.
69 OPA, Benin Civil Court Record Book 1941 #15, #179/1940, Amadasun of Benin v.
A.B. Suberu of Benin.which foreigners are not normally permitted to cultivate, although
many migrant farmers operate rubber farms as share-croppers
while many others have had rubber estates pledged to them by bank-
rupt indigenous farmers.” Tappers lived in small camps by the farms.
In Ogwashi-Uku of Asaba Division, where migrants were Ibos and
Isokos, locals felt that they
“live out in the bush, adopt wasteful farming methods, create
trouble, evade tax and are not amenable to control … they lead
an unassimilated life of their own, buy, sell and lease house prop-
erty, take up farms in the nearby bush, ignore the chiefs and are
still not amenable to control” (Rowling, 1948, p. 35).
The people of Akuku-Atuma village demanded that all migrants
leave in 1946, while Okpanam village accepted a limited number on
the condition that they lived in the community and not in the bush
Udo (1975, p. 131).5.5.2. Planters
Many wealthier planters were chiefs, traders, and colonial em-
ployees resident in Benin City (Usuanlele, 2003), and later Lagos, Iba-
dan and Kano (Udo, 1975, p. 79). This is a contrast with other African
experiences with tree crops, in which migrants from outside ethnic
groups formed a signiﬁcant portion of the planting class. In some
parts of the Benin Province, strangers were barred altogether from
planting. One respondent told me that:
In our village a non-native or foreigner are forbid[den] from plant-
ing rubber or oil palm… No it's not the Oba that made the rule but
the community that made the rule to protect and guide the future
generation. That if you allow the non-native to permanent crops
by the time they had gone those people will start claiming owner-
ship of the land. The only way to prevent dispute in the future is to
prevent them from planting permanent crops.70
For strangers that did plant, their rights were not the same as
those of locals. For example, when a stranger grantee died, the Oba
would insist on primogeniture and not the stranger's custom of inher-
itance (Rowling, 1948, p. 10). By the late 1930s, the Oba and Council
were wary of applications by strangers to plant permanent crops, be-
cause they could not be sure of strangers' willingness to recognize
their authority, and were concerned about keeping enough land
available for future generations (Ward-Price, 1939, p. 117). Rowling
(1948, p. 10) found that opinion was “rigid” that non-Edo must not
have unqualiﬁed rights in land and must hold their land from the
Oba. The defendant in a 1942 case, who was accused of attempting
to sell his rubber farm to a non-Edo, pleaded guilty on the grounds
“because I am hungry.” The court reminded him that it had been
prohibited to sell to foreigners “so as to avoid land disputes and
confusion.”71
Disputes exist where these strangers were opportunistically
threatened with eviction. Two 1941 cases72 concerned the position
of strangers in Ekhor. Some ﬁve years before, strangers had planted
rubber there, paying initial fees of either 2s or 4s/6d to the odionwere.
When the Oba and District Ofﬁcer ordered that strangers could not
plant permanent crops without permission from the odionwere (see
Section 5), some of the local Ekhor complained, threatening these
strangers. They responded by grouping together to pay 10s each addi-
tionally to the odionwere. In a separate case from 1936, one petitioner
complained to the District Ofﬁcer that he was being evicted from70 Interview #4.
71 OPA, Ehor Umagbae Court of Appeal 1941–42 #176, #37/42 Gbinoba Odionwere of
Okemuen v. Alue of Erhunmwusee Camp.
72 OPA, Egbede NC and Civil Record Book 1941 No. 174A: #229/41 Oke of Ekhor v.
Okuoghae of Ekhor and No. 174A: #228/41 Oke of Ekhor v. Osakhuawonmwen of
Ekhor.
237J. Fenske / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 226–238Obajere after eleven years.73 He claimed that the scribe of the Oba's
court had already convinced the Obajere people to divide his rubber
farm in two, taking half. “Not content with that,” the petitioner
wrote, “he started worrying me to leave Obajere saying I was not
born there and could therefore have no land interest there. By his in-
stigation the Obajere people rooted some of my rubber trees and he
himself planted some rubber trees at the entrance of my plantation.”
The Obajere people demanded presents of 6s and 10s, but the clerk
ordered them to return the petitioner's money “as he did not wish
them to soften” towards him.
As land scarcity became more apparent throughout the colonial
period, these demands became more insistent. In a 1957 suit, the
complainant claimed that he had lived in Ugbeka for ten years
when the ﬁrst of the accused returned from Benin, asking one of the
plaintiff's witnesses to quit his farming plot, since it had belonged
to his father. He then recruited ﬁve others to help him destroy the
plaintiff's rubber and cassava crops. The plaintiff's witness took out
a civil action, but “to avoid trouble,” the plaintiff told the court “he
kept quiet and repented to the police.” He suggested that the
odionwere had sent the accused to destroy the crops.74 While I have
found only limited evidence of conﬂict precipitated by return migra-
tion in colonial Benin, it was not altogether absent. The above case
is an example. Rowling (1948, p. 4) wrote that a claim over fallow
could be upset in favor of a Bini man.
The ethnic component of land conﬂict was not prevalent in Benin,
but it existed when the disputants felt they could proﬁt by highlight-
ing it. The plaintiff of a suit from the 1930s wrote to the District Ofﬁ-
cer that he did not want his case to be heard in the local Native Court,
on the grounds that he was “an ISHAN and the Defendant a Benin and
under all circumstances, there will not be justice in the Native Court.”75
One complainant from 1944 wrote to the Resident that he was a native
of Evbronogbon–Jesse, whose father had been one of the settlement's
founders. Evbronogbon had recently been transferred from the jurisdic-
tion of Benin City to Jesse in Warri Province. Chief Umayan, a council
member at Jesse, then led a campaign to stop him from tapping his rub-
ber unless he paid £10 in yearly rent.76 The Jesse Council denied that his
father had founded the settlement, and directed the District Ofﬁcer to a
Native Court case in which he had admitted their claim.775.6. Identiﬁcation
These changes were mostly limited to plots planted with rubber.
Rowling (1948) found that few disputes existed over land planted
to food (p. 5), that rights secured by tree crops were the only ones
with permanence (p. 6), that land was only a marketable asset
when “scarcity value” was created by the planting of trees (p. 18),
that no claims to land not under permanent crops were established
in Agbor by having worked it (p. 25), and that cultivation of food
crops in Ogwashi-Uku was a “fairly elastic business” (p. 33). Occa-
sionally in the court records, a claimant will state that land not
planted to permanent crops has been “sold,” but it is later revealed
that only the rights over a standing crop such as cassava were ex-
changed.78 This contrast was enabled by the rhetorical distinction be-
tween land and crops; while the rights and disputes that existed over
rubber were effectively over the land itself, it was possible to claim73 NAI, BD 153 Petitions Obajere NC: 27 Oct 1936: Osaze to DO Benin.
74 OPA, Native Court of Appeal, Benin City 1958–59, A 255/57 L.G. Police (?) v. Osagie
and Others of Obagie Village in Ugbeka.
75 NAI, Ben Prof 1 BD 65 Vol 11: Petition Benin Native Court: 24 Oct, 1936: Sado to
DO.
76 NAI, WP 149 rubber production: 4 Dec, 1944: Chief Ireto Olutse to Resident Warri.
77 NAI, WP 149 rubber production: 19 June, 1944: Jesse Chain Council to DO Jekri-
Sobo.
78 NAI, e.g., Ben Prof 8/1/2 Civil Judgment Book 1909–1911, Unoghenen v. Ebale
(1910) #16.that rubber was no different than any other standing crop (e.g.
Rowling (1948, p. 6)).
Colonial reports frequently state that most land disputes in Benin
revolved around tree crops. Rowling (1948, p. 5) wrote that food cul-
tivation led to “remarkably little friction … what litigation there is
concerns permanent crops.” All recorded instances of trespass in-
volved permanent crops (p. 6). Courts recognized that tree crops
were different; while they would not order uprooting of food crops
in a trespass case, they would do so for rubber, though aggrieved
owners could not take the law into their own hands (p. 7).
How did Benin compare to neighboring regions? In Afenmai,
Rowling (1948, p. 14) reported that, excepting lease to aliens under
statute and a single group purchase by refugees during the Nupe
Wars, sale, pledge and lease of land were “unknown in the division.”
Permanent crops, however, could be pledged, mortgaged, or sold. The
same was true in many districts of Ondo (Rowling, 1952). In Owo in
1952, there was no sale of land, but permanent crops could be sold to
another Owo without permission (p. 14). In Ekiti, where population
density was close to 100 per square mile, sale of land was “generally al-
leged to be an inconceivable squandering of the [lineage] trust-
property” (p. 23). In Akoko, which at nearly 150 persons per square
mile was the densest part of Ondo Province, the Federal Council only re-
luctantly admitted the existence of clandestine land sales when faced
with examples in the court records. That sale and pledge of permanent
crops existed, however, went “barely without saying” (p. 31).
Land disputes in Afenmai were said to be rare. Where they existed,
they were attributed to tree crops. Bradbury (1957, p. 96), for exam-
ple, wrote of Ivbiosakon that “[l]and litigation is very rare, but dis-
putes over the ownership of permanent crops, especially cocoa, are
becoming more frequent.” At Etsako, similarly, he noted that bound-
ary disputes had been rare in the past, though the introduction of per-
manent crops and the rising value of the palm oil industry had
created pressures to deﬁne boundaries between villages (p. 106).
The types of disputes concerning land not planted to rubber that
were heard before the Native Courts tended to concern damages to
standing crops, and notmore fundamental rights. Typical claims include
larceny of cassava79 or damages for a farm destroyed by cows.80 Dis-
putes over tree crops other than rubber were very similar to those
concerning Para. In a 1941 case, for example, the plaintiff tried unsuc-
cessfully to claim rents from “Sobos” who were reaping the fruits of
palm trees his father had planted.81 They were paying a group rent of
8s to the defendant's brother, but the plaintiff wanted each of them to
pay 1s. The case was dismissed on the grounds that they had paid for
what they reaped.6. Conclusions
The introduction of Para rubber as a tree crop in colonial Benin in-
creased the permanence of land rights and weakened communal con-
trol over land. Within communities, disputes over rubber focused on
expropriation of communal land, boundaries, and inheritance. These
disputes were socially embedded, and courts were only one venue
in which they were pursued. Rubber spurred both temporary and
permanent market transfers of land. Disputes came as the conse-
quence of rentals, pledges and sales. The former focused more on
terms and conditions, while the latter often involved attempts by
sellers' families to reclaim land that had been lost, or to contest who
had the right to make a sale. Social acceptance of sales was not imme-
diate or widespread, and the more profound change in land tenure79 Benin Native Court 1931–32 #129: #583/32 — Akpakuma of Urokuosa v. Enoruwa
of Ahue Camp.
80 Egbede Native Court 1939–40 #6/39: #58/39: Igabari of Igbogile v. Ekhator of
Uobe.
81 Benin Civil Court Record Book 1941 #15: #482 and 483/41 J.N. Aimufua of Benin v.
Agbonfo and Osuya.
238 J. Fenske / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 226–238was a shift from acquisition by clearing to acquisition by inheritance.
These patterns are similar to those experienced by other parts of
West Africa that adopted tree crops, and so Benin provides further ev-
idence that these responses to the commercialization of tree crops are
generalizable (Berry, 1988).
There are, however, differences between Benin and other cases
that highlight the role of local context in determining how property
rights respond to the commercialization of tree crops. In particular,
pre-colonial rules governing land tenure and the power of chiefs,
the late spread of rubber, and the relative absence of stranger planters
made Benin different from other cases.
Rubber increased the size of farms, driven in part by competition be-
tween chiefs and peasants who were both permitted to appropriate
communal land. Primogeniture limited the reversal of individualization
over time. Stranger planters held fewer rights than Edo-speakers, and
were opportunistically evicted, but were relatively unimportant. Rental
and sharecropping of rubber farms to Ibo tappers did lead to tensions,
and colonial ofﬁcials worried that these contracts did not create incen-
tives to preserve the health of the trees. Themulti-generational and eth-
nic tensions seen in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire were, however, largely
absent. Edo planters and itinerant tappers were less vulnerable to
re-interpretation of custom and expropriation than migrant planters
elsewhere. The impact of tree crop cultivation on land tenure in Benin,
then, operated through processes similar to other cases, but was medi-
ated by the speciﬁcs of local context.
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